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Abstract 
We analyze the treatment and impact of idiosyncratic or firm-specific risk in regulation. 
Regulatory authorities regularly ignore firm-specific characteristics, such as size or asset ages, 
implying different risk exposure in incentive regulation. In contrast, it is common to apply 
only a single benchmark, the weighted average cost of capital (WACC), uniformly to all 
firms. This will lead to implicit discrimination. We combine models of firm-specific risk, 
liquidity management and regulatory rate setting to investigate impacts on capital costs. We 
focus on the example of the impact of component failures for electricity network operators. In 
a simulation model for Germany, we find that capital costs increase by approximately 0.2 to 
3.0 percentage points depending on the size of the firm (in the range of 3% to 40% of total 
cost of capital). Regulation of monopolistic bottlenecks should take these risks into account to 
avoid implicit discrimination. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In regulation it is common that the costs of equity capital only include compensation for the 
systematic rather than also the unsystematic risk incurred by the regulated firm’s 
shareholders. 2  They are assumed to diversify their portfolios perfectly, allowing them to 
ignore the latter type of risk.3 Financial distress costs, however, may arise from imminent 
insolvency or illiquidity caused by unsystematic (or idiosyncratic) risks, making it optimal for 
a firm to engage in costly hedging. The acknowledgement of resulting costs, in contrast to 
regulatory practice, is then essential. 
A major rationale behind this argument is the need for liquidity management to obviate costly 
insolvency or bankruptcy. An unregulated automobile manufacturer, for example, would 
include these costs in its overall profit maximization and determine a hurdle rate higher than 
capital costs to compensate for firm-specific risks eventually incurred. These may equally 
depend on the riskiness of single projects or portfolio composition. In an unregulated market, 
a competitive equilibrium outcome would therefore consider costs arising from idiosyncratic 
risks. It is then a logical consequence to acknowledge occurring transaction costs in a 
regulated market, compensating firms properly for bearing corresponding risks and related 
costs. Furthermore, this is independent of the choice between either cost plus or incentive 
regulation regimes. Under rate of return or total cost based rate regulation, firm-specific risk 
is usually borne by the customer on the basis of a “used-and-useful” criterion when an actual 
loss is incurred. In other words, this is a cost rollup, which attenuates visibility to the regulator 
and disguises risk-induced costs. In contrast, pure price or revenue-based rate regulation4 will 
make idiosyncratic risk directly visible through firms’ additional spending on costly hedging.  
One classic example for a regulated industry is the operation of electricity networks. An 
operator faces some important sources of idiosyncratic risks related to uncertainty regarding 
the unforeseeable, stochastic failure of its production assets. For example, the relative 
importance of this risk will depend on the firm’s network size. 5 Given the law of large 
numbers, bigger network operators will have a relatively lower risk exposure than smaller 
operators. The latter will consequently have to spend relatively more on their liquidity 
management activities and suffer an economic disadvantage even when the average cost of 
the pure operation of the network is the same.6 The consequence in this example is that the 
regulatory process may discriminate against smaller firms in the presence of such 
idiosyncratic risk. It is also observable in practice that smaller firms typically complain of 
increased pressure due to the relatively high stochasticity of cash flows after the introduction 
of incentive regulation. In a broader context, the costs of capital markups linked to size effects 
(and granted by the market) are found to be significant. For example, Banz (1981) and Fama 
and French (1995, 1997) find substantial average systematic risk premia for smaller firms in 
general. Adding to this evidence, in a study focusing on electricity network operators, 
Schaeffler and Weber (2013) find a significant size-related risk premium. So far, explanations 
of these empirically observable effects have focused on capital-raising economies through risk 
                                                 
2 Idiosyncratic risk is also known as unsystematic, firm-specific or firm-dependent risk.  
3 Following this rationale, the costs of equity capital are then calculated using well-known models, such as the 
capital asset pricing model, the three-factor model, or the arbitrage pricing theory. 
4 Guthrie (2005) uses this more correct term of “pure price or revenue based rate regulation” rather than the 
widely known but less exact term “incentive regulation.” 
5 Also, other firm characteristics may systematically impact the failure behavior of assets, e.g., differences in 
asset age structure. The term “failure behavior” describes the stochastic properties of the production assets in 
place, such as the distribution law they follow, its moments and how this distribution law depends on size 
characteristics, or, for example, on age structure characteristics. 
6 Size effects due to the stochasticity of failure events correspond to some form of economies of scale due to the 
law of large numbers. Yet, they differ from economies of scale effects usually discussed in the context of firm 
size and, to our knowledge, have not been discussed in the previous literature. Huettner and Landon (1978), 
Roberts (1998), and Filippini (1998) present evidence with regard to economies of scale linked to network size 
from density effects in the production function, which have an impact on average costs. However, they do not 
consider the impact of network size on risk.  
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reduction in the part of a firm’s equity that covaries with a market portfolio.7 In contrast, the 
focus in this article is on the impact firm size may have on idiosyncratic risk on the 
production side and the resulting impact on possible financial distress. This is not linked to 
any covariation with a market portfolio but nevertheless involves additional costs. 
The aim of this article is therefore to demonstrate the effects of the regulator neglecting 
idiosyncratic risk. Both the regulatory framework and physical failure are investigated in an 
analytical model. Resulting capital cost markups are derived. Furthermore, a simulation study 
based on German electricity network regulation gives insights into differences in idiosyncratic 
risk exposure and their impact on capital costs. Calculated markups are compared to actual 
current capital cost and found to be significant. Ignoring these differences is thereby shown to 
raise implicit discrimination issues. 
The contributions of this article are fourfold. First, a sound framework is developed to assess 
the impact of idiosyncratic risk in production on capital cost via an analysis of the liquidity 
management decision (section 2). In line with Holmström and Tirole (2000), who investigate 
the nexus of investment optimization, risk and liquidity management, liquidity management 
here is assumed to take place after investments have been made.8 The sequential investment-
liquidity management assumption also corresponds to business practice, where two separate 
organizational units are typically responsible for reinvestment and liquidity management. For 
liquidity management, the model used in this article notably includes bank lines of credit9 as 
an instrument. As these contain an upfront fee that will later reduce negative cash flows and 
thereby overall cash flow variation, they have clear similarities to costly hedges. Second, an 
analytical model of the size-dependent idiosyncratic risk source is used to derive the key 
result that risk exposure decreases with firm size (section 3). An analytical stochastic 
stationary state model of network operation with perfect replacement is used to investigate the 
effects of size on expected costs, standard deviation of costs and the coefficient of variation as 
a scale-neutral risk measure. Other important cost drivers such as supply conditions 
(differences in load, density and so forth) are omitted to clearly demonstrate the risk-
decreasing effect of firm size. Third, a Monte Carlo simulation based on representative data 
from more than 800 German electricity network operators is used to estimate the empirical 
relevance of idiosyncratic risks (sections 4 and 5). A detailed network representation and 
empirically estimated failure rates are used to obtain valuable and conservative estimates of 
risk exposure. Fourth, by coupling the network replacement investments and resulting risk 
exposures with the previously developed financial and liquidity management models, the 
impact on capital costs is evaluated (section 6). 10  This provides clear indications for 
regulators on how to account for size effects in price, revenue or rate of return regulation. 
Section 7 concludes the article. 
                                                 
7 See Scherer and Ross (1990) for a detailed discussion of this and other types of economies of scale. However, 
these authors also do not consider the indirect type of economies of scale related to reduced idiosyncratic risk 
and the corresponding lower need for liquidity buffers. 
8 In contrast to the theoretical model of Holmström and Tirole (2000), we exclude hedging (in its classic sense) 
after the investment decision has been made. Network operators cannot hedge their idiosyncratic risk using 
traded financial securities. Some hedging, in the form of insurance contracts, can be envisaged in principle. 
However, so far only limited activities are empirically observable. Moreover, asymmetric information 
concerning asset states and moral hazard constitute serious problems for a well-functioning secondary market 
(cf., e.g., Caillaud et al. 2000, who discuss the relevance of costs from asymmetric information in the context 
of insurance—equivalent to a loan commitment—and debt contracts. 
9 Bank lines of credit are also known as revolving credit facilities or loan commitments. 
10 Analyzing the impact on liquidity management is certainly only one option in demonstrating the possible 
monetary consequences of additional uncertainty from idiosyncratic risks. It is the alternative of choice in this 
article because the necessary assumptions for the calculation of liquidity management costs are the least strict 
and most empirically attestable. Liquidity management in this context is understood as the optimal decision to 
secure the going concern in possible illiquid states and prevent financial distress. It thereby minimizes 
expected costs, including distress costs, given a certain distribution of stochastic cash flows resulting from 
investment decisions. Hedging is complimentary to liquidity management as it is usually understood as a (not 
necessarily costly) activity to modify the original cash flow distribution. 
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II. IDIOSYNCRATIC RISK, CAPITAL COSTS AND REGULATION 
i. Relevance of Idiosyncratic Risk for Regulation 
Most regulators solely consider systematic risk by granting equity returns on the regulated 
asset base, e.g., by employing the capital asset pricing model (CAPM).11 The CAPM is in 
widespread use and is applied by a multitude of regulators. For example, Schaeffler and 
Weber (2013) investigate risk premia for electric utilities and state that the vast majority of 
European regulators (all of the 19 countries investigated) use the CAPM, refraining from the 
inclusion of any idiosyncratic risk components. 12  Other models, such as the three-factor 
model (TFM) or the arbitrage pricing theory (APT), have been proposed to estimate 
systematic risk premia.13 Like the CAPM, they have been suggested to estimate systematic, 
undiversifiable risk exposure, i.e., the degree of covariation between firms’ equity values and 
market portfolios. The former model tries to do this by categorizing firms, e.g., in relation to 
size or book-to-market ratio, whereas the latter tries to find statistically relevant explanations 
for equity variation by adding macroeconomic factors (e.g., inflation, business cycle state). In 
the special case of electricity and telecommunications utilities, Fama and French (1992) 
derive slightly negative risk premia for smaller firms in contrast to the findings and arguments 
in this article. Especially in the German case investigated in sections 4 to 6, neither a 
systematic nor an idiosyncratic risk premium is granted in practice. 
In contrast, variation in equity value due to idiosyncratic risk is by definition not correlated to 
a market portfolio. Therefore, firm-specific risk is considered irrelevant for investors as they 
are supposedly able to diversify optimally in the absence of any transaction or liquidity 
constraints. However, several market imperfections make idiosyncratic risk costly—and 
consequently also provide an incentive for hedging. In the context of optimal (external) 
financing, Froot et al. (1993, p.1633) state that “…hedging is beneficial if it can allow a firm 
to avoid unnecessary fluctuations in either investment spending or funds raised from outside 
investors.” The authors further point out several rationales for hedging idiosyncratic risk. One 
of the central arguments for costly hedging is the risk of insolvency or bankruptcy. The 
obviation of firm liquidation makes liquidity management necessary, which in turn comes at a 
cost. If volatile earnings expose the company to a significant risk of running into illiquidity, 
risk mitigation may be rational to obviate the potentially higher costs of resultant financial 
distress. These costs are substantial and comprise high transaction costs from possible 
insolvency or bankruptcy,14 but most importantly include the increased costs of refinancing 
because of an ex ante higher probability of bankruptcy. This may also lead to a downgrading 
in rating.15 Whereas the direct costs of financial distress seem to be small (e.g., litigation 
fees), the indirect costs, such as loss of market share, inefficient asset sales or lost investment 
opportunities, appear to be more pronounced.16 These transaction costs will then entail the 
convexity of financing costs. The more pronounced the firm-specific risks, the greater the 
incentive for hedging and the ensuing expected cost of hedging and cost of capital. This and 
                                                 
11 See, e.g., Sharpe (1964) inter alia. 
12 This study includes all major European countries as well as New Zealand and Australia. Among these, only 
Kosovo provides a supplementary premium of 1.3% for size differences.  
13 See Fama and French (1992) on the TFM and Ross (1976) on the APT. 
14 In general, bankruptcy costs may range from approximately 10% to 25% of firm value (see, e.g., Bris et al. 
2006, who analyze the depreciation of book values of 286 companies during their bankruptcy processes). 
Reimund et al.’s (2008) study of 46 German DAX companies draws on analysts’ forecasts concerning market 
values and similarly determines a depreciation of approximately 28% on average, but up to 44% of the 
enterprise value in extreme cases. 
15  Almeida and Philippon (2007) complement the literature on the value of financial distress using the 
probabilities of bankruptcy, which are conditional on the state of the economy. As financial distress is more 
likely to occur in periods of economic downturn, the probability of experiencing distress increases more than 
threefold in some cases, i.e., from approximately 1.4% of the NPV of a firm pre distress to approximately 4.5% 
for a BBB-rated firm. The authors state that the value of distress can be as important as marginal tax benefits. 
 
16 See, e.g., Opler and Titman (1994) and Shleifer and Vishny (1992). 
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some other arguments based on market imperfections17 rationalize hedging and spending for 
liquidity provision in the light of idiosyncratic risk. Furthermore, in the context of 
infrastructure regulation, sunk costs and regulatory discretion over cash flows make 
idiosyncratic risk directly relevant to the firm. Brennan and Schwartz (1982) show that firm-
specific risks increase capital costs under historical cost-based regimes until the regulator 
approves costs in the next hearing. Evans and Guthrie (2005) show that idiosyncratic risks 
will increase capital costs also in price-based replacement cost standard incentive regulation 
regimes by post hoc (after hearings) cash flow adjustments. They investigate the effects of 
demand and replacement cost fluctuations when investments are irreversible. If regulators do 
not account for these firm-specific risks, the regulated companies might not break even in the 
long run. The introduction of price or revenue-based regimes often makes idiosyncratic risks 
transparent, whereas under cost-based regimes such risks are usually borne by the customer 
on the basis of a “used-and-useful” regulation.  
The risks caused by stochastic failures triggering replacement costs and possibly quality 
penalties are an important part of these idiosyncratic risks. Stochastic asset failure directly 
influences the company’s cash flows. The next subsection demonstrates how this risk can 
correctly be considered in a regulatory price setting. 
ii. Liquidity Management and Capital Cost with Idiosyncratic Risk 
The total return risk of a firm can be separated in a systematic part and an idiosyncratic part. 
With r being the rate of return for a network operator,18 rf  and rm being the risk-free return 
and the return of the market portfolio, β, being the ratio of the covariance of the returns to the 
network operator and the market portfolio and the variance of the return on the market 
portfolio, and ε the risk in returns from idiosyncrasies, the return of a company may be written 
as: 
( 1 )  ( ) .1 εββ ++−= mf rrr  
As network firms are small—as is the whole network infrastructure sector—compared to the 
entire economy, idiosyncratic risks will barely influence the market return or the market price 
of risk. Nevertheless, idiosyncratic risks do matter from a private firm perspective. In 
particular, the costs of financial distress provide a clear incentive for the firm to engage in risk 
and liquidity management activities and induce additional costs. As concluded by Froot et al. 
(1993), hedging comes at a certain cost and that cost will have to be recognized by a regulator 
to ascertain the potential for refinancing and thereby participation as well as efficient behavior 
by the regulated agent. In many regulatory regimes in which a WACC is applied to a 
regulatory asset base, this condition is not fulfilled. 
Before entering into a detailed discussion of the implications for the regulatory design, a valid 
model for quantifying the costs of idiosyncratic risk is needed. The focus is thus on the costs 
of liquidity management as these are the least tied to strong assumptions and also most 
obviously lead to additional costs.19 Liquidity management will then either imply additional 
expenses M0 for costly hedging and/or an additional capital buffer B to avoid financial 
distress. From the point of view of the network firm, the actual rate of return also depends on 
                                                 
17  Other reasons for market imperfections and therefore engaging in costly hedging include the imperfect 
diversification of agents, who hold a significant share of their wealth in the firm (see Stulz, 1984; Smith and 
Stulz, 1985), moral hazard calling for an effort-inducing rent guaranty to the agent making hedging necessary 
(see Holmström and Tirole 1998, 2000; Tirole 2005) or asymmetric information concerning the agent’s 
performance, when volatile results could be misinterpreted as arising from a lack of effort or incompetence. A 
final reason might simply be convex taxation functions, which lower earnings when losses cannot be carried 
forward to other periods (see Froot et al. 1993).  
18 We focus on the return on the total asset base disregarding the question of the optimal long-term capital 
structure (on this issue, see Schaeffler 2012). 
19 Costs resulting from other hedging motives are in general more difficult to assess because of observability and 
quantification problems. This is notably the case for the risk aversion assumed in the frameworks of Froot and 
Stein (1998) and Holmström and Tirole (2000). Nevertheless, the estimates obtained from subsequent 
calculations have to be interpreted as lower boundaries for costs induced by idiosyncratic risks. 
5 
 
the incoming cash flows Yi, the outgoing (other) cash flows Y0 and the conventional asset base 
A, i.e. the so-called “regulatory asset base” given by the following equation:20 
( 2 )  
BA
MYY
r oi
+
−−
= 0  
The hedging cost of liquidity management is then summed as M = M0 + E[r]B including 
current expenses M0 for, e.g., the use of revolving credit facilities, short-term capital 
acquisition or insolvency and the costs of additional capital B. Capital B can be employed at 
the cost of capital rate r. When an agent receives an incentive-compatible contract, the 
corresponding expected firm value V will be maximized thus:  
( 3 )  [ ] MArEYYV oi −−−=max  
The incoming cash flows Yi are determined by the transported electricity ω and the network 
tariffs R, which are assumed to be exogenously given. Temporary deviations in the quantity ω 
(e.g., demand fluctuations) add to the stochasticity of incoming cash flows. Thus: 
( 4 )  .ω⋅= RYi  
The outgoing expenses consist of expenses for planned replacement C, for unplanned 
replacement S and all other costs Q and the opportunity costs of holding capital to finance the 
regulatory asset base A:21  
( 5 )  QSCYo ++=  
A network firm has several options in relation to facing potential liquidity shortages and 
minimizing liquidity management costs M. First, and most simple, it could take up capital in 
advance to ensure sufficient sources in the case of need. However, holding cash for capital 
buffers B implies opportunity costs. Second, it could secure bank lines of credit L–B. Third, it 
could “wait and see” and raise capital in the short-term. 
The advantages and the relevance of these different options are discussed extensively in the 
literature, on theoretical as well as empirical grounds. Acharya et al. (2007) show that it is 
optimal for financially constrained firms to transfer cash from high cash flow states to low 
ones to finance more profitable projects later. In their words, cash thus is not negative debt 
and cash will be preferred to debt. Flipping the coin, in a later article, Acharya et al. (2009) 
relate their arguments to the aggregate risk exposure of a firm. Firms with high systematic 
risk will have problems and find it too expensive to satisfy their liquidity demand in times of 
sparse liquidity in the entire economy and thus rely more heavily on cash than firms with low 
systematic risk. Demiroglu and James (2011) survey (mostly) empirical literature and find 
results on the substitutability of cash and debt or credit lines to be contradictory. There is 
some evidence that in having a line of credit, the marginal value of cash is lower. On the other 
hand, financially constrained firms are found to associate a positive marginal value with both 
cash and credit lines, which implies that both are necessary. Relatively unconstrained firms, 
by contrast, rely on credit lines (see Flannery and Lockhart 2009). 
We thus give the firm the choice between up-front liquidity provision through cash and credit 
lines or ex post replenishment through short-term action. This approach is similar to that 
adopted by Disatnik et al. (2010). They analyze the use of exchange rate derivatives for cash 
flow hedging and find a positive effect of hedging on the relative use of bank lines of credit 
compared to cash. Both are thus found to be (imperfect) substitutes,22 or, as Kashyap, Rajan 
and Stein put it in their seminal article of 2002: “deposits and loan commitments offer to bank 
customers a very similar service: the provision of liquidity on demand to accommodate 
unpredictable needs” (p. 35).23  
                                                 
20 Leverage is treated as exogenous here; on the question of optimal capital structure, see, e.g., the models of 
Scott (1976) and Bradley et al. (1984). Note that these approaches include potential bankruptcy but do not 
consider illiquidity problems.  
21 Holding additional capital to finance the liquidity buffer is included in M. 
22 Cash flow hedging will reduce the uncertainty in demand for cash, thereby making it easier to satisfy the 
contingencies of lines of credit. Adding the cost advantage, the authors can analytically and empirically 
demonstrate a relative increase in the use of credit lines and in firm value. 
23 Holmström and Tirole (1998) add the argument that holding cash is not efficient when adverse cash flow 
shocks are not highly correlated across firms. It is then more efficient for banks to serve as liquidity pools, 
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In our model, liquidity management decisions on risk capital B and total liquidity L are made 
in view of a maximization of the firm value V (cf. equation (3)): 
 ( 6 )  [ ]MrAYYE oiLB −−−,max  
The cash flows from Yi  and Y0 and the asset base A and the required return on equity E[r] 
cannot be influenced by the liquidity management decisions on L and B. Writing 
x = Yi - Y0, the problem therefore reduces to: 
( 7 )  ( )[ ] ( )[ ]xLBMExLBME
LBLB
,,min,,max
,,
=−  
Thus, the expected additional costs of liquidity management are minimized. These include a 
number of capital cost parameters depending on the source chosen. Holding liquidity buffers 
through up-front capital provision B at cost r is a common option, where r is the opportunity 
cost of holding capital, i.e., the weighted average cost of capital. At the other extreme, short-
run capital replenishment can be used to balance ex ante uncovered capital needs. Short-run 
replenishment necessitates a supplement of u over the usual cost of capital r, which totals r + 
u. This might well include the eventuality of bankruptcy. As a third possibility, the firm may 
choose bank lines of credit. The prices for this option consist of two parts: a variable 
commitment fee s1 for an option to take the bank lines of credit up to an amount of B–L and a 
second variable part for actual usage at an additional supplementary cost s2 adding to the 
capital cost r. Thereby, capital provision under this option amounts to r + s2.  
Thus the following maximization problem arises: 
( 8 )   
( )[ ]
( )( )[ ] ( ) ( ) ( )( )[ ] ( ) 


 −+++−+++=
−
∫∫
−
−
−
∞−
BrdxxfsrBxsLBdxxfurLx
xLBM
B
L
L
LB
LB
21,
,
max
,,max
 
Under the assumption of normally distributed cash flows x, the optimization with respect to 
the two decision variables B and L becomes analytically tractable. First order conditions lead 
to the following two necessary conditions for the optimal solution:24 
( 9 )  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )Lfsr
sLFur
BL
sr
sr
LFBF
−+
−−+
+=
+
−
+−=−
2
1
2
1  
These equations only allow solution by numerical methods; nevertheless, inspection reveals 
some regularities in line with intuitive expectations. According to the first condition, a notable 
increase in s1 or s2 obviously leads to a rapprochement of L and B, which means that when 
lines of credit become more expensive, they will be sourced to a lesser extent. In contrast, an 
upward shift in r, which makes risk capital provision more expensive, will make lines of 
credit relatively less expensive and thus making their extension profitable. This approach will 
be used to compute capital buffers and lines of credit empirically in section 6. Then, the 
additional costs resulting from idiosyncratic risk may be expressed as risk premia on top of 
the rate of return required for the regulatory asset base.  
Summarizing the arguments thus far, specific risk stemming from the stochasticity of the 
production function should play a more important role in regulation. The following section 
provides a cash flow model of network replacement, permitting the identification of cash flow 
risks due to the network structure.   
III. ANALYTICAL MODEL OF SPECIFIC FAILURE RISK 
Consider a network operator under quality regulation that optimizes its replacement 
strategies.25 The costs considered correspond to the capital expenditure for replacement of 
                                                                                                                                                        
issue liquidity insurance, and provide liquidity only to firms that receive liquidity shocks. As a result, credit 
lines will be a more efficient means of providing liquidity. 
24 The derivation of these solutions is contained in Appendix I. 
25 Similar to Markowitz (1952), costs and the risk measure are treated separately. Combining the two can be seen 
as a portfolio menu from which the optimizing network operator is able to choose. A constant level of risk 
aversion is assumed, which would have to be adjusted for different levels of risk aversion when applied by an 
authority.  
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equipment, C, and the supplementary cost for premature replacement as well as penalties for 
not delivering the quality expected by grid customers, S.26 The decision variables are the 
replacement ages tj at which asset j is subject to planned replacement. In order to keep the 
problem analytically tractable, we choose a stationary setting and focus on the equilibrium 
state. 27 Thus, time in our model is represented by the index t (which can be considered 
equivalent to the asset age) and the replacement age tj.28 The failure probability of an asset 
depends on its conditional failure rate r(t), the probability that an asset fails once it has 
reached age t. This is related to its unconditional failure rate f(t) and its cumulative survival 
distribution 1–F(t) through:  
( 10 )  ( ) ( )( )tF
tftr
dttdFtf
−
=
=
1
/)()(
 
Another expression necessary to identify the optimal replacement age in a stationary state is 
given by the expected utilization period G(tj). This corresponds to: 
( 11 )  ( ) ( )( )dttFtG
jt
o
j ∫ −= 1  
G(tj) and the cumulative survival distribution 1–F(t) are required to identify the lifetime 
distribution H(t, tj) that will occur in the stationary state. Thereby, G(tj) is normalized by 
dividing it by Dref, the time unit used for measuring t and tj: 
( 12 )  ( ) ( )( ) refjj DtG
tFttH −= 1,  
Equipment that fails has to be replaced, which leads to the differentiation of planned 
replacement Rnorm (due to the fact that the asset’s age attains the decision variable replacement 
age, thus t = tj) and premature replacement Rprem (due to failure while t < tj). Premature 
replacement is given by: 
( 13 )  ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( ) refj
j
t
refjj
t
jjjprem DtG
tF
dttf
DtG
dttrttHtR
jj
=







⋅=⋅= ∫∫
00
1;  
Planned replacement can be calculated as follows: 
( 14 )  ( ) ( ) ( )( ) refj
j
jjjnorm DtG
tF
ttHtR
−
==
1
,  
With K corresponding to the unit costs for replacement, the replacement costs add up to:  
( 15 )  ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) refjjnormjpremj DtG
KtRtRKtC =+⋅=  
The costs related to the supplementary costs for premature replacement and quality penalties 
depend on network reliability (which is primarily governed by the number of failures and the 
network structure). For the sake of simplicity, we assume a direct link between the number of 
failures and the corresponding quality penalties and premature replacement costs. For each 
failure, a penalty has to be paid to the regulator and extra money has to be spent on immediate 
measures, the sum of which is s. Thus we can write: 
                                                 
26 The penalty is based on customer failures. Nevertheless, for an identical customer and network structure, this 
is equivalent to a revenue-based penalty. 
27 This general setting is described in more detail in Weber et al. (2010). However, the regulatory perspective is 
not addressed in their article. 
28 In the context of this analytical model, the initial (or starting) age of an asset is not of relevance. However, in 
dynamic models, the initial age structure of equipment is highly relevant in the context of optimization. 
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( 16 )  ( ) ( )( ) refj
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In this stationary equivalent-age replacement model, the objective function of a network 
operator with n assets is given by: 
( 17 )  
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Assuming an optimization for n identical assets, the network operator’s objective function is 
given by:29 
( 18 )  ( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) 



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 +
=+
refj
j
tjjt DtG
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minmin  
This implies a simplifying assumption with regard to output prices and quantities. Price and 
quantity are not strategic variables for the firm in that it cannot influence its own earnings 
level. Prices and earnings are assumed to be solely determined by the regulator (e.g., in the 
form of a cap), leaving the firm only with a cost minimization problem including the trade-off 
between cost savings on the one hand and avoidance of extra cost resulting from premature 
failure or quality penalization on the other hand. Although they are central in many principal-
agent frameworks, decisions concerning strategic cost-reducing efforts or investments or 
participation decisions also have to be ignored to keep this model analytically tractable. It is 
therefore equivalent to a pure price-based contract with no cost-based share. 
By deriving the objective function, the necessary optimality condition for an interior solution 
is obtained:30 
( 19 )  ( ) 0)()(0)()( =+−−⇔=
∂
∂
+
∂
∂
refjjjs
j
j
j
j DtGtrtFK
t
tS
t
tC
 
The existence and uniqueness of the optimum interior solution clearly depend on the 
increasing failure rate (IFR) characteristic of the density function.  
 
Proposition 1: 
Assuming identical assets, expected total cost µ = E[C(tj) + S(tj)] will increase monotonically 
and even proportionally in the number of assets n, independently of the shape of the failure 
density assumed.  
 
Proof:  
Expected premature replacements nRprem and normal replacements nRnorm lead to expected 
total costs:  
( 20 )  ( ) ( )[ ] ( )( ) ( )( )premnormpremnormpremjj sRRRKnKRRsKntStCE ++=++=+=µ . 
Expected total costs stem from regular replacement and quality penalties. Clearly, costs 
increase proportionally to n.  
 
 
Proposition 2: 
                                                 
29 To keep the model analytically tractable, the objective function does not formally incorporate the agent’s risk 
attitude. If one introduces risk attitude in the function, smaller network operators’ optimal replacement strategy 
will deviate from larger operators’ strategies as they will attach a higher weight to the risk component in the 
objective function. This would result in earlier replacements, reducing risk but increasing the expected cost. 
Overall, a socially suboptimal replacement policy would imply additional costs for smaller operators. 
30 See Weber et al. (2010). 
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Independently of the characteristics of the failure density function, the variance var[C + S], 
which constitutes a scale-dependent risk measure, increases monotonically with increasing n. 
The coefficient of variation σ/µ as a scale-free risk measure decreases monotonically with 
increasing n. 
 
Proof: 
Under the assumption of premature failure following a binomial distribution with failure 
probability Pprem, the variance of premature replacements can be calculated as nPprem (1–
Pprem). One may note that both Rprem and Pprem are defined by F(tj)/(G(tj)/Dref, yet this expression has two different interpretations. Rprem represents the share of assets expected to be 
replaced prematurely in the current year. However, the same expression also describes the 
cumulative failures which appear until tj divided by the average lifetime of an asset given a 
certain tj. In other words, the expression F(tj)/(G(tj)/Dref may also be interpreted as an average 
yearly failure probability in the stationary state and will then be denoted by Pprem. The 
variance of total costs as a function of Pprem  is given by 
( 21 )  [ ] ( ) ( )premprem PnPsKSC −+=+ 1var 2 .31 
In this simplified model, premature failure imposes extra (re-)investment costs proportional to 
s. However, variance in total costs stems both from the quality penalty and usual reinvestment 
costs due to premature failure.32 Premature replacement is caused by assets that are younger 
than tj. On the other hand, normal or planned replacement is caused by assets of age tj that are 
replaced in the usual replacement process. Assuming identical assets, total cost variance 
follows the binomial distribution law.  
Evidently, variance in absolute terms will increase with the number of assets. To obtain a 
scale-invariant measure of the risk, the increase in variance has to be standardized by 
expected cost. A meaningful dimensionless risk measure is obtained by normalizing the 
standard deviation σ as the square root of the variance by the expected costs. This ratio, 
known as the coefficient of variation, makes an assessment of the relative importance of risk 
possible: 
( 22 )  ( )
( )( )normprem
premprem
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=
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σ  
With regard to the definition of Pprem, (22) can be transformed into the following expression, 
with Ks = K / s: 
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31 Independence between asset failures is assumed. Cases for positive or negative correlation are both imaginable 
and would lead to an additional covariance term, which could also be positive or negative. As these effects are 
second order, they are of minor interest in the analysis. 
32 For example, extra maintenance costs for emergency teams, provisional solutions, and so forth.  
10 
 
Clearly, the coefficient of variation decreases with n in line with the law of large numbers. 
Thus, an issue of implicit discrimination might arise if regulation authorities do not account 
for additional costs due to this idiosyncratic risk. A second question arises: Does the regulator 
reinforce or weaken this effect by introducing quality regulation mechanisms? Unfortunately, 
the analytical model does not provide a clear answer. Both expected costs and the standard 
deviation increase in s; thus, the impact on VarC is ambiguous.  
IV. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS: STRUCTURAL ASSUMPTIONS, FAILURE BEHAVIOR 
AND COST DATA 
In order to evaluate the risks linked to the network size of real world network operators, the 
Monte Carlo simulation technique is applied in Matlab. Thereby, different asset classes are 
distinguished and a typical network configuration is assumed. The stochasticity of the model 
is generated via asset group and age dependent random failure events, which lead to 
probability distributions for quality indices and a total cost C + S. Three sources of 
uncertainty are included in the model. First, asset failure may or may not occur for any single 
asset in the network. Second, asset failures may lead to outages if assets are not redundant, 
meaning that another network component may take on the function of the failed equipment. A 
binomial distribution based on redundancy assumptions generates random outages based on 
failures and links the outages to the number of customers that would be affected. Third, the 
duration of outages varies significantly. Failure times for each outage are considered via a 
skewed Weibull distribution. 
i. Network Components and Structure 
The simulation approach assumes a network consisting of single assets linked in a network 
structure. An illustration of the basic network structure of a German operator is presented in 
Figure 1. Different network sizes will be accounted for using a size parameter, which will be 
handled as a multiplier building on network length for the basic structure. Network length is 
one of the central cost drivers and is therefore taken by the German regulator BNetzA, for 
example, as a proxy for size in efficiency comparisons.33 The choice of network length as the 
size multiplier also draws on the fact that the representative network structure of the average 
operator is built on the basis of a sample of German operators of all sizes. We therefore 
choose network length as the scaling parameter. All failures are considered to be independent 
of each other, i.e., the failure of one component has no technical impact on the state of any 
other component.  
Nevertheless, if a component at a higher voltage level fails (such as a transformer), all 
customers connected to that component will naturally be affected. The number of customers 
affected by a component failure depends primarily on two aspects: the number of connected 
customers and redundancy. The number of connected customers is linearly distributed across 
the number of components. Failure consequences are attenuated with the use of redundancy 
concepts. If one component fails, redundancy may prevent failures because another 
component compensates for the failed component. In general, the components’ age structure 
follows the lifetime distribution H(t, tj) that occurs in the stationary state.  
                                                 
33 See ARegV (2012). 
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Sign Equipment Quantites
Transformer 12 
Circuit breaker 90 
Overhead lines (mv) 450 km
Cables (mv) 150 km
Relay stations 600
Overhead lines (lv) 1,200 km
Cables (lv) 200 km
Industry customers 15
Comm. customers 4,200
Households 57,400
 
Figure 1: Basic network structure (for details see Appendix IV) 
ii. Failure Rates 
The failure rates of components technically depend on a multitude of different factors, such as 
age, electrical stress (for instance overload) and mechanical stress (wear and tear, e.g., 
through tension, pressure, and vibrations). In the context of network simulations, many 
approaches only capture the influence of age as complete data sets for all other influencing 
factors are rarely available and the age of a network is intimately linked to investment 
strategies. For the present simulation model, age-dependent failure rate curves are derived 
from two major distribution parameters and approximated using Weibull distributions.34 
iii. Failure Duration/Downtimes 
Failure durations or downtimes indicate the time span during which customers are not 
supplied with power; they consequently have a significant impact on quality indices. Average 
failure durations linked to asset clusters are available in outage statistics such as, for instance, 
VDN (2005, pp. 28 ff.). As this paper focuses only on average durations, distribution laws are 
estimated based on confidential project data available to the authors and adapted in order to 
match the average failure durations from the published source. The use of a Weibull 
distribution is an appropriate approach to modeling failure durations due to its skewness.35 In 
practice, the majority of outages are relatively short, while a few outages may last a very long 
time. 
iv. Penalties, Replacement Costs and Network Tariffs 
Estimates for replacement costs K are based on Consentec et al. (2008, pp. 113 ff.). Penalties   
s are calculated for each asset class and consider the number of customers affected, the degree 
of redundancy, the average duration of an outage, the average consumption of each customer 
segment and a standard penalty of €10 per kWh of energy not supplied. 36  One further 
assumption is that premature replacement leads to additional costs of 20% compared to 
planned replacements due, for instance, to add-on-expenses for provisional solutions. 
v. Structure of German Electricity Distribution 
Research articles, regulatory authority publications and similar documents detailing the size 
and the structure of German network operators have not been published to date. 
                                                 
34 See Appendix V. 
35 Data from VDN (2005, pp. 66 ff.) show that failure duration distributions are skewed, caused by a small 
number of very long outages. 
36 This assumption is made based on Billington (2000) and Roberts (2001). This assumption will be modified to 
€1/kWh, €50/kWh and €100/kWh. 
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Consequently, a survey was conducted gathering relevant data on cable and overhead length, 
transmitted energy, points of consumption and supplied inhabitants from all 880 German 
network operators, of which only 700 data sets could be extracted due to insufficient 
compliance with legal obligations. These data, describing network structures in 2008, were 
gathered from the network operators’ websites.37 In order to structure the data sets, network 
operators were sorted by total network length. The overall range is from 106.000 km (EnBW 
Regional) to 30 km (several very small local operators). Five percent quantiles regarding 
network length were built, each containing 35 network operators. Consequently, the 0–5% 
quantile includes the 35 largest network operators. Figure 2 shows the repartition of structural 
indices by quantiles.  
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Figure 2: Share of network operations by size in quantiles 
 
An initial, very clear result is the extremely high concentration of network activity within the 
big operators. The 35 largest companies operate approximately 70% of the total network in 
terms of length, provide 80% of all energy through their networks, and cover 60% of the 
consumption points. From all the data and figures presented, one can conclude a very high 
degree of concentration. The typical firm described before, located in the 10–15% quantile, 
operates a network with a length of 2,000km and 70,500 points of consumption, transmitting 
1,715 GWh. However, 80% of all companies operate a network of less than 1,000 km. The 
median network operator has a network size of only 370 km. This will be of significant 
impact in the simulation, as we expect large network operators to be less affected by single 
network events and consequently less risky.  
V. SIMULATION AND SIMULATION RESULTS 
In the following section, the results from the Monte Carlo simulations are presented in order 
to discuss the propositions made in section 2 in further detail. The replacement strategy 
considered implements an age-based replacement rule based on the stationary calculus 
described above.  
Also, in this context, the assumption of representative network structures leads to a 
conservative estimation of potential discrimination. Idiosyncratic risk stemming from network 
operation is measured by the coefficient of variation σ/µ, abbreviated to VarC in tables and 
illustrations. In the first step, the absolute failure numbers are simulated in n = 100,000 runs 
following the binomial law with respect to redundancy assumptions. Total expenses for 
premature replacement and quality penalties add up to approximately €9 m (given a size of 1), 
which is significant in view of a total turnover based on network tariffs of approximately €38 
m and thus is close to approximately 25% of turnover.38 Total network quality as measured by 
                                                 
37 This is possible due to the fact that German distribution network operators are obliged to publish a significant 
amount of structural data in line with legal obligations. See § 27 Stromnetzentgeltverordnung (StromNEV, 
2006). 
38 These revenues were estimated based on the average transmitted energy in our data samples. Tariffs are based 
on BNetzA (2008, pp. 45). LV-tariffs were calculated as the average of Dc and lb tariffs, the MV-tariff was 
calculated as the average of lg values, and only data from 2008 were considered. One has to take into account 
13 
 
the System Average Interruption Duration Index (SAIDI) is approximately 30 minutes per 
year.39 This value appears low, as European countries such as Italy or Greece report SAIDIs 
of more than 100 minutes, but is very plausible for Germany and other countries such as the 
Netherlands or Austria.  
Three major assumptions are relevant in explaining this low SAIDI level. First, the asset 
lifetime distribution following the stationary state optimum has an impact on the SAIDI. 
Networks with a higher number of older components will see higher SAIDI values. Second, 
an optimal replacement strategy that considers additional costs due to penalties and premature 
replacement is assumed, which is not yet found in many European countries. Third, average 
interruption durations are based on German data and may vary in other countries. If these 
assumptions were modified, SAIDI would increase significantly. Interestingly, quality 
penalties only account for 3% of replacement-related expenses under the given assumption of 
10€/kWh.  
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Figure 3: Effect of network size  
 
Figure 3 shows the idiosyncratic risk and the share of German distribution network operators 
that are of the given size. As discussed in Propositions 1 and 2, total costs increase 
proportionally, standard deviation increases under-proportionally and thus specific risk, 
measured by the coefficient of variation, decreases with network size. The discriminatory 
effect is considerable as the coefficient of variation of a network operator of approximately 
100,000 km corresponds to approximately 0.03, the values of a small operator (with 200km) 
being 22 times higher. Interestingly from the standpoint of a regulation authority, 95% of 
network operators will be subject to a coefficient of variation greater than 0.15, whereas the 
5% of largest network operators will be affected by an average coefficient of variation of 
0.06. The coefficient of variation for the standard network operator of size one amounts to 
0.2. The observed effect supports the relationship formulated by the analytical model. It is 
moderately greater than the relationship of n/1  derived in the analytical model, which is due 
to some changes in the assumptions regarding stochastic properties in relation to redundancy 
and failure durations and the use of a Weibull failure distribution. Overall, however, the 
analytical model proves a valid instrument to approximate simulation results. Kolmogoroff-
Smirnov tests show that variations in total costs and SAIDI follow a normal distribution 
starting at a size of 30, corresponding to a 60,000km network, while the System Average 
Interruption Frequency Index (SAIFI) is already normally distributed around the size of 20.40 
                                                                                                                                                        
that only 50% of total network costs are considered open to influence by the German regulatory authority due 
to the influences of transmission networks, license fees and subventions for renewable energy sources.  
39 The SAIDI is the average outage duration for each customer served per year. It is calculated by dividing the 
sum of all customer interruption durations by the total number of customers served.  
40 The SAIFI is calculated analogously to the SAIDI. It is calculated by dividing the sum of all customer 
interruption frequencies by the total number of customers served. 
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The focus of the discussion will be on quality penalties as regulators have considerable 
discretion regarding their level. Higher penalties will lead to earlier replacement, whereas 
financial risk may increase with lower penalties due to higher penalty expenses. Quality 
penalties, if set at the adequate level of customers’ valuation, seem to be an effective 
instrument to incentivize a socially optimal quality standard. Table 1 shows the results for the 
expected values µ of the direct quality measure SAIDI and total cost C + S, standard 
deviations of costs for additional replacement measures σprem,pre, costs of quality penalties 
σprem,s  and total costs σC+S. The coefficient of variation is also given. 
  
Penalty µSAIDI µC+S σC+S  σprem,pre  σprem,s  σC+S/ µ C+S 
€1/kWh 51 13,756 2,789 2,786 5 0.203 
€10/kWh 30 14,067 2,744 2,716 45 0.195 
€50/kWh 13 14,879 2,715 2,586 174 0.182 
€100/kWh 10 15,562 2,681 2,422 319 0.172 
Table 1: Effect of quality penalties 
 
An increase in quality penalties leads to a reduction in the risk measure VarC. The range of 
the SAIDI levels from approximately 50 to 10 minutes shows that quality regulation can have 
a major impact on network quality. In the case of Germany, socially optimal quality penalties 
of approximately €10/kWh would lead to slightly higher SAIDIs than today, with a switch 
from about 20 minutes currently, to 30 minutes. Intuitively, expected total cost increases with 
higher penalties while the overall effect on the standard deviation decreases: The trade-off 
between the price effect (higher cost for each failure) and the quantity effect (fewer failures 
due to earlier replacements) is visible, as σprem,s (the standard deviation exclusive of penalties) 
increases less than σprem,pre (the standard deviation from additional cost due to premature 
replacements, no penalties included) decreases.  
This is an aspect that should be of interest to the regulator: Increasing quality penalties will 
reduce the firm’s risk exposure (although it increases total costs of course).  
 
VI. THE IMPACT OF IDIOSYNCRATIC RISK ON THE COST OF CAPITAL 
Based on the previous section, this section provides an empirical assessment of the financial 
consequences for regulated firms. Required capital cost markups are calculated for German 
electricity network operators and compared to current actual capital costs. The German 
regulator simply limits capital cost to a uniform rate, 7.38%, for all operators irrespective of 
firm specifics. Equity cost is calculated by the CAPM. The WACC is calculated by taking the 
firm’s cost of debt and averaging this using an equity-debt ratio of 2:3.41 In the framework of 
the financial model introduced in section 2, the return on the capital used is given by equation 
(2): 
 
.0
BA
MYY
r oi
+
−−
=  
In the rate setting process, the regulator should then allow for the expenses of liquidity 
management M0 and include the buffer B in the capital base. However, it may be difficult to 
apply this approach due to a lack of reliable data. Thus, the regulator may alternatively 
increase the allowed return on the regulated asset base A. The required modification is given 
by
 
( 24 )  ,
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−
=  
where M/A describes the costs related to liquidity management as a fraction of the regulated 
asset base. At the same time M/A is the markup on conventional capital costs required by the 
                                                 
41 See Frontier Economics (2008) and § 7 Abs. 6 in the German regulation of electricity charges (StromNEV 
2011). Debt is further capped at a “common market rate,” cf. § 5 Abs. 2 (StromNEV 2011). 
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operators. Subsequently, this intuitive interpretation is used to compute necessary increases in 
the rate of return to compensate for the respective exposures to firm-specific risk. 
As the failure behavior of assets leads to a distribution with fat tails in the chosen empirical 
context, the assumption of normally distributed cash flows is dropped. Instead, the optimal 
financial policy here is found by simulating n = 100,000 cash flow realizations and 
subsequently choosing optimal capital buffers B and credit line commitments L to minimize 
liquidity costs. We therefore minimize losses following the adaption of equation (9) to the 
case of discretely simulated overall cash flows with equal probability 1/N.  
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We use capital cost data based on German regulation, with a WACC of 7.38%.42 The costs of 
pure network operation (stochastic failure and corresponding cash flow patterns obtained in 
the preceding section) are supplemented by the remaining costs of the operator, which are 
assumed to be independently and normally distributed. These other costs are obtained top 
down by subtracting EBT and network operation cash flows from yearly revenues. Thus, by 
definition, this residual also incorporates all other sources of uncertainty, e.g., cost, demand, 
or revenue uncertainty. 
Different scenarios are investigated to highlight the impact of regulatory settings and firm 
characteristics on the required markup. First, two standard deviation scenarios (5% SD and 
10% SD) are defined, with 5% and 10% of expected other costs respectively. Second, the firm 
may choose to pay either 0% or 50% of its profits (EBT) to shareholders (dividend payment: 
0% DP and 50% DP). The usual assumption in this context would be that firms realize profits 
first and then decide how much to distribute. However, for some private companies and 
especially in the context of small public enterprises, it is not uncommon to guarantee a 
minimum payout on expected profits to investors. In the case of public firms, one could also 
think of pre-engaged income for other cross-subsidized municipal activity, such as the 
maintenance of infrastructure or schools. In addition, three different cost specifications were 
distinguished; the difference in results was however minor. 43  
The resulting markups regarding the different scenarios are shown in Figure 4. The current 
actual WACC of 7.38% granted by the German regulator BNetzA is depicted as a baseline. 
The variation of markups between network operators of different size is very important. The 
smallest network operators would need additional idiosyncratic risk premia of between 2–3%. 
This corresponds to the money not available to network operators. Total capital cost in such a 
case would have to amount to approximately 9.4% or 10.1% to compensate for the liquidity 
management costs associated with idiosyncratic size risk. 
                                                 
42  For the quantification of financial effects, the WACC is taken as 7.38%, which may be considered 
conservative in comparison to current international regulatory settings for returns on capital. This is based on 
the return rate for equity of 9.29% set by the German regulator and an interest rate on debt of 6.1%, given a 
40% share of equity in total capital. For the standard network operator, approximate revenues of €38 m and a 
firm value of approximately €160 m are derived as an approximation from network charges and average 
customer sizes (see footnote 38). Correspondingly, earnings before interest and taxes (EBT) have to be close to 
€6 m or 15.65% of total revenues in order to cover capital costs. 
43 A low, medium, and high cost scenario were defined. Whereas the weighted capital cost rate is set at 7.38% 
throughout, in the low-cost scenario, the fixed credit line fee is 0.25%, the rate for actual usage is an additional 
2%, and short-run capital provision is assured at 12.5%. The parameters for the medium-cost scenario are 
0.5%, 3% and 12.5%. The high-cost scenario then assumes a substantially higher rate of 35% for short-run 
capital provision as may occur when asset fire sales become necessary. Interestingly, throughout the different 
cost scenarios there is only a slight variation of approximately 10% upwards and downwards respectively. 
Therefore, we employ the medium-cost scenario in the following exposition of results. 
16 
 
 
0.0%
2.0%
4.0%
6.0%
8.0%
10.0%
12.0%
50% DP, 10% SD 50% DP, 5% SD
0% DP, 10% SD 0% DP, 5% SD
Undifferentiated regulatory WACC  in Germany (7.38%)
 
Figure 4: Impact of size variation on capital cost markups 
 
For smaller network operators, a higher standard deviation again has a less sizeable impact 
than the imposition of minimum dividend payments. This is somewhat different for larger 
operators: The markups are near zero for all DP-SD scenarios except for the extreme 50% 
DP/10% SD scenario. Only the combination of both effects will lead to a noticeable, but still 
small-scale, increase in liquidity management costs. This result is due to the different scaling 
of the standard deviations related to asset failures and other costs. Whereas the law of large 
numbers is applied to asset failures, the standard deviation from other costs by definition 
persists even for very large operators. This may originate from demand fluctuations or input 
price fluctuations. We further tested the impact of quality penalties on the reported markups 
on the cost of capital, but found an increase or decrease in the markup of 10% at best. 
Consequently, the level of quality penalties does not contribute in any important way to 
discrimination. 
VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
In this article, the impact of firm-specific risk borne by network operators in relation to capital 
costs has been discussed. By applying equity prices to cost bases determined from physical or 
accounting data, regulators typically ignore costs related to firm-specific risk. In a stylized 
model environment, including corporate liquidity management, we have identified the source 
of this disregard and laid out the consequences: negligence of justifiable cost elements gives 
rise to discrimination issues. Difficulties in refinancing ongoing business activities may also 
arise. When a regulator is concerned with granting a level of remuneration allowing firms to 
stay in business, it should thus consider idiosyncratic risk sources. Here the article makes an 
important contribution by deriving possible required markups consistently from a formal 
model of liquidity management and idiosyncratic risk. Hence, an overall framework is 
provided, combining operational and financial modeling in view of optimal regulatory rate 
setting. 
The firm-specific risk considered here is the cash flow risk related to component failures. The 
relative importance of this risk is dependent on firm size as a consequence of the law of large 
numbers. Especially after the introduction of incentive regulation, smaller firms typically 
complain of increased burdens stemming from the high volatility of their reinvestment needs. 
Here, stochastic failures imply a type of economies of scale which has scarcely been 
addressed in the literature. These failures induce a higher need for (financial) capital. This 
tends to be neglected by most regulators, which apply a return rate to the regulatory asset 
base, solely considering systematic risk. Network operators thus suffer from substantial 
financial costs due to firm-specific risks related to their size, which is shown analytically and 
empirically: The additional capital costs correspond to total rate markups ranging between 0% 
and approximately 2.9%, which corresponds to up to 40% of capital costs for the smallest 
operators. These estimates are comparable to the effects derived in Evans and Guthrie (2005). 
However, for the average network operator with approximately 2,000 km of network, the 
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impact of idiosyncratic risk is found to be moderate. The estimates are conservative 
assessments based only on the cost of liquidity management. Other issues, e.g., risk aversion 
on the part of the firm’s management, may even aggravate the effects described.  
Beyond the size effects considered here, other sources of idiosyncratic risk, such as 
heterogeneous asset age, may induce similar consequences for capital costs. These should be 
included in the regulatory process as long as they alter financing needs. Typically, as 
idiosyncratic risks stem from individual sources, they are mutually independent and financing 
needs will increase. However, only the study of more elaborated models of the joint 
distribution of idiosyncratic risks in question may provide deeper insights, depending on the 
specific case inspected. This is left to further research.  
A more in-depth discussion of regulatory responses to this potential discrimination is beyond 
the scope of the present paper. Nevertheless, it should be mentioned that choosing the correct 
compensation level is important to avoid creating perverse incentives. In the same way that 
neglecting size-related capital cost markups will bias the choice of operating scale towards 
larger firm sizes, overcompensation has a tendency to reduce firm sizes. The difference is that 
in the former case, firms might not break even, which risks additional welfare losses caused 
by insolvency, bankruptcy, or inefficient takeovers. This, of course, also holds for incorrect 
compensation for other idiosyncratic risks. 
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APPENDIX 
Appendix I 
 
The optimal simultaneous choice of up-front capital provision B and choice of credit lines L is 
implicitly defined by solving the firm’s objective function contained in equation (9). Usually, 
s1<<s2, which does not restrict the following results: 
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Assuming normal distribution characteristics for stochastic cash flows x, an implicit solution 
of the optimization is possible: 
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The solution for B is of course analogous: 
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Again, assuming normally distributed cash flows will make the following solution possible: 
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Appendix II 
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Appendix III 
It is sufficient to show that total cost is convex in replacement age: 
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This is done by showing that the second derivative of this composition of polynomials is 
positive: 
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By inspecting the following transformation, this can easily be seen. µ is convex in tj. 
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Appendix IV 
This network structure is based on Obergünner (2005), who presents the components of a 
standard distribution network operator in German electricity distribution. The network 
components (or asset clusters) are as follows: transformers, circuit breakers, overhead lines 
(medium and low voltage), cables (medium and low voltage), relay stations. This structure 
consists of: six transformer stations (with 12 transformers and 90 circuit breakers), 600 relay 
stations, and 2,000 km of cables and overhead lines. 
Transformer stations (with the transformers and circuit breakers), which are connected to the 
high voltage grid, transform electricity to medium voltage and feed into medium voltage 
rings. Industry customers are directly connected to transformer stations. Based on the 
analytical network modeling approach in Consentec et al. (2008), which has also been used by 
the German regulator for various regulatory purposes, we determine that five medium voltage 
rings, each 20 km in length, are connected to each transformer station. A medium voltage ring 
consists of cables and overhead lines, which connect several relay stations per ring. At each 
relay station, electricity is transformed to low voltage and fed into low voltage cables and 
overhead lines which provide low voltage customers via a string structure. Each ring includes 
20 relay stations, from which four low voltage lines per relay station (each 600 m in length) 
connect households, commercial customers and others (i.e., traffic, agriculture, public 
institutions). This corresponds to a typical distribution network operator’s structure. 
 
Appendix V 
The 80% survival age indicates the age that 80% of assets will attain without replacement or 
major repair (the value of the cumulative distribution function CDF attaining 0.2), the 20% 
survival age indicates the age at which 80% of assets in one cluster will have failed 
(CDF=0.8). The estimates for these survival ages reflect practitioners’ current expectations of 
asset lifetimes. 44 Based on these assumptions, Weibull failure distribution laws for the 
conditional failure rate have been estimated (see Figure 5 for cumulated distribution 
functions).  
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Figure 5: Cumulative failure distribution based on Weibull law 
 
Appendix VI 
The customer segment definitions were taken from BNetzA (2008, p. 45), drawing on the 
overall yearly consumptions from BDEW (2008). The number of customers was derived from 
                                                 
44 A vast body of empirical research concerning the lifetime of network components has been published to date. 
One research article regarding cables is Densley (2001). Lindquist et al. (2008) analyze the reliability of circuit 
breakers. FGH (2006) presents aging models for all sorts of different component types. Unfortunately, there is 
no single article that summarizes research in this field and is able to provide consistent lifetime distributions 
for all asset types required in the simulation. A first obstacle is the vast number of possible different definitions 
of survival age and approach to modeling it. Second, research focuses mostly on transformers, circuit breakers, 
and cables. To our knowledge, there is no extensive research available on relay stations. Consequently, the 
cumulative failure distributions are derived as assumptions from practical insights. 
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the data gathered with reference to the share of total line length (2,000 km compared to 
approximately 1,600,000 km overall in Germany). 
 
Equipment  Unit Industry Households Commercial/others 
Total yearly consumption  MWh 256,000,000 139,500,000 146,700,000 
Yearly consumption/customer MWh 24,000 3.5 50 
Number for operator size 1 # 12 57,400 4,200 
Table 2: Customer specific data 
 
Survival ages were deduced from project experience and the data gathered. AVG failure 
duration was taken from VDN (2005), and Weibull parameters were estimated based on 
averages. Asset replacement cost can be found in Consentec et al. (2008, p. 113), and 
additional unplanned replacement costs were estimated at 20% of planned costs based on 
project experience. Penalties were calculated based on €10/kWh, customer-specific data in 
Table 2, average failure durations and assumptions concerning network structure and 
redundancy. 
 
Equipment  Unit Transf. CB CMV OLMV REL CLV OHLV 
Optimal replacement  Years 33 32 61 46 28 61 46 
80% survival age Years 25 25 40 35 25 40 35 
20% survival age Years 35 35 60 50 35 60 50 
AVG failure duration Min 99 99 97 138 96 183 220 
Failure duration (Weibull-α) - 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 
Failure duration (Weibull-β) - 104.80 104.80 102.27 146.97 102.48 195.42 238.18 
Asset replacement cost €T 615 40 140/km 30/km 60 65/km 25/km 
Additional cost unplanned 
replacement 
€T 123 8 28 6 12 13 5 
Penalty/industry customer € 49,452 49,452 - - - - - 
Penalty/commercial 
customer 
€ 95 95 93 133 93 176 212 
Penalty/household € 7 7 6 9 7 12 15 
Table 3: Component specific data 
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